Society · Young India and work
Giving up or taking back control? Inside India’s “lying-flat” generation
Education, work, independence, a home and a family. What happens when the expected life keeps getting harder to finance?
Study hard. Get a good job. Move out. Buy a home. Marry, if you want to. Raise a family.
The sequence sounds ordinary. Each step is supposed to make the next one possible: education opens the door to work; earnings pay for independence; savings turn a salary into security. For a young person trying to follow that path, the difficult question is where the money and the time will come from.
What happens when getting the job takes years, and getting paid still leaves the next stage out of reach? Another exam attempt postpones earnings. Moving to the city where the jobs are creates a rent bill. A home loan or a hospital stay can make a modest cushion feel very small.
That is the economic question behind India’s “lying-flat” conversation. The term can describe a refusal to keep chasing an expected life. It can also conceal very different circumstances: a person changing ambitions, someone unable to find work, or someone working without pay at home. The evidence here follows the obstacles along that expected path. It does not count a generation that has chosen to give up.
01 / Finding secure work
How many years can the first step take?
For some graduates, a government job becomes the route through which the rest of life is meant to become possible. Preparing is an investment in that future. The difficulty is deciding when another attempt stops being a useful investment and starts consuming the years it was supposed to improve.
Siddharth moved away from UPSC preparation in stages. After graduating in engineering in 2014, he prepared for UPSC, then enrolled in law after two unsuccessful preliminary exams. He continued attempting the examination in 2017 and 2018 before concentrating on law. In his March 2022 interview, he described working in an advocate’s chambers in Delhi. He had not ruled out another attempt, but had stopped making his professional life wait for it.
His account illustrates a change of direction, not how most aspirants fare. He prepared for UPSC. A separate recruitment system, SSC’s Combined Graduate Level examination, shows the scale of competition for another route into government employment.
Millions apply. Thousands reach the final list.
SSC Combined Graduate Level Examination 2025 · counts at successive stages
About 185 applications for each person on the final provisional shortlist.
Applications and Tier-II qualifiers are approximate. This comparison is not an individual candidate’s chance of selection.
Divide approximately 2,800,000 applications by 15,118 recommendations: 185.21, rounded to about 185. Applications are not exam attendance. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; CGL 2025; final result 14 May 2026. Unit: applications / candidates. Denominator: Reported applications, Tier-II qualifiers and provisional recommendations.
| Group | Value | Qualification |
|---|---|---|
| Applications | 2800000 | Rounded by source |
| Qualified for Tier II | 140000 | Rounded by source |
| Final provisional shortlist | 15118 | Exact; provisional recommendations |
A crowded examination is also a commitment of time. Even a single recruitment cycle can stretch across the calendar while candidates study, wait for results and decide whether to prepare again.
One recruitment cycle stretched across 339 days.
From applications opening to the final result · CGL 2025
That is nearly a year inside the recruitment process, before counting preparation.
Tentative and scheduled dates are marked separately. January Tier-II conduct is corroborated by the final PIB announcement; the exact dates here are the published schedule.
Elapsed days = 14 May 2026 minus 9 June 2025. This excludes prior preparation and the time to appointment. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; 9 June 2025–14 May 2026. Unit: calendar dates. Denominator: One SSC CGL recruitment cycle.
| Start date | Display order | End date | Event | Status | Source URL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-06-09 | 0 | 2025-06-09 | Applications open | Actual | https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2135796&lang=2®=48 |
| 2025-07-04 | 1 | 2025-07-04 | Applications close | Actual | https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2135796&lang=2®=48 |
| 2025-08-13 | 2 | 2025-08-30 | Original Tier-I window | Tentative | https://ssc.gov.in/api/attachment/uploads/masterData/ExamCalendar/Tentative%20Calendar%202025%20_%20051224.pdf |
| 2025-09-12 | 3 | 2025-09-26 | Main Tier-I examinations | Actual | https://ssc.gov.in/api/attachment/uploads/masterData/NoticeBoards/writeup_181225.pdf |
| 2025-10-14 | 4 | 2025-10-14 | Re-examination | Actual | https://ssc.gov.in/api/attachment/uploads/masterData/NoticeBoards/writeup_181225.pdf |
| 2025-12-18 | 5 | 2025-12-18 | Tier-I result | Actual | https://ssc.gov.in/api/attachment/uploads/masterData/NoticeBoards/writeup_181225.pdf |
| 2026-01-18 | 6 | 2026-01-19 | Tier-II examinations | Scheduled | https://ssc.gov.in/api/attachment/uploads/masterData/NoticeBoards/CGLE2025ImportantNoticedated19_12_2025.pdf |
| 2026-05-14 | 7 | 2026-05-14 | Final provisional result | Actual | https://ssc.gov.in/api/attachment/uploads/masterData/Results/writeup_14052026.pdf |
Aspirants who change direction need somewhere else to go. That makes the next question unavoidable: what opportunities does their qualification offer outside the examination queue?
02 / What qualifications deliver
The degree is in hand. The job may not be.
A graduate can be qualified and still spend months looking for suitable work. National unemployment figures show how difficult that transition can be, although they cannot tell us whether an individual is holding out for a particular job or unable to find any job at all.
A degree does not guarantee a way into work.
Unemployment rate by education · ages 15–29 · usual status · 2025
Among graduates in the young labour force, 22.3% were unemployed.
These are shares of the labour force at each education level, not shares of all graduates. The comparison does not establish that education causes unemployment.
All-India rural + urban, persons aged 15–29, usual status (principal + subsidiary); Table 21, row 404, columns C–J. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; 2025. Unit: percent. Denominator: Labour force aged 15–29 within each education group.
| Group | Value |
|---|---|
| Not literate | 2.3 |
| Up to primary | 2.8 |
| Middle | 4.6 |
| Secondary | 5.5 |
| Higher secondary | 9.3 |
| Diploma / certificate | 13.8 |
| Graduate | 22.3 |
| Postgraduate and above | 24.7 |
These rates describe people participating in the labour market. They leave out people who are neither working nor seeking or available for work, a distinction we will return to. They also tell us nothing about the salary a successful applicant eventually accepts.
That salary matters because the first offer sets the starting budget for adult life. There is a real history behind the complaint that some entry-level IT packages still sound familiar decades later. But “India’s starting salary has not changed since 2005” is too broad a claim. Employers, roles, benefits and hiring tracks differ.
Entry-level Infosys pay: two snapshots, eighteen years apart.
Published annual entry pay · nominal rupees · different recruitment cohorts
The published figures are ₹2.7 lakh and ₹3.6 lakh a year.
An illustrative comparison within one employer’s entry-level hiring, not an India salary series. The old transcript does not itemise benefits; the current figure is CTC, not take-home pay.
The 2007 amount is stated by an analyst in a question about fresher salaries; management discusses past and future increases without correcting it. The 2025 figure is the Systems Engineer offer, not the higher-paid Specialist Programmer offer. Component-level equivalence cannot be established, so no real-wage or exact like-for-like growth claim is made. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; 13 April 2007 call and 2025 placement cohort. Unit: rupees per year. Denominator: Published entry-level annual compensation at Infosys.
| Group | Value | Compensation definition | Locator | Source URL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 · fresher salary | 270000 | Entry-level fresher salary discussed in earnings call; detailed CTC components not specified | 13 April 2007 earnings call, p.4 | https://www.infosys.com/investors/reports-filings/quarterly-results/2006-2007/q4/documents/transcript/afternooncall-13-4-07.pdf |
| 2025 · Systems Engineer | 360000 | Annual cost to company; university placement offer | USAR 2025 placement report, Table 4, pp.5–6 | https://www.ipu.ac.in/Pubinfo2025/usarplcrep2025260725.pdf |
The Infosys example shows a modest entry-level offer surviving alongside much better-paid routes. The same 2025 university report lists a ₹9.5 lakh Specialist Programmer package. Neither offer represents every fresher. And ₹3.6 lakh in annual cost to company does not mean ₹30,000 arrives in a bank account each month: employer contributions and other components can sit inside the package.
The practical test of an offer comes after the headline number. Once a person moves for work, how much of that income remains after the ordinary costs of living?
03 / Paying for independence
A salary has to buy a life in the city.
Independence means paying for things that a family household may previously have absorbed: groceries, cooking fuel, transport and a place to sleep. Slower inflation can ease the rate at which those bills rise. It does not undo the increases already built into them.
The price level kept climbing into 2026.
Consumer price index · India, rural and urban combined · January 2025–July 2026
Consumer prices were 6.17% higher in July 2026 than in January 2025.
July 2026 is provisional. Price growth does not measure affordability; that also depends on income.
All observations use the same new 2024 base. This is an 18-month change, not annual inflation; the series is not spliced to the former 2012-base CPI. Published monthly indices; cumulative increase = (107.94 / 101.67 − 1) × 100 = 6.17%.
India; January 2025–July 2026. Unit: index, 2024 = 100. Denominator: All-India combined consumer price basket.
| Month | CPI (2024 = 100) | Estimate status |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-01-01 | 101.67 | Published |
| 2025-02-01 | 101.32 | Published |
| 2025-03-01 | 101.39 | Published |
| 2025-04-01 | 101.58 | Published |
| 2025-05-01 | 101.9 | Published |
| 2025-06-01 | 102.51 | Published |
| 2025-07-01 | 103.35 | Published |
| 2025-08-01 | 103.74 | Published |
| 2025-09-01 | 103.74 | Published |
| 2025-10-01 | 103.74 | Published |
| 2025-11-01 | 104.01 | Published |
| 2025-12-01 | 104.1 | Published |
| 2026-01-01 | 104.45 | Published |
| 2026-02-01 | 104.57 | Published |
| 2026-03-01 | 104.84 | Published |
| 2026-04-01 | 105.12 | Published |
| 2026-05-01 | 105.91 | Published |
| 2026-06-01 | 107.0 | Published |
| 2026-07-01 | 107.94 | Provisional |
The price level rose 6.17% over these eighteen months. That does not tell us whether a particular salary kept up, or whether a healthy diet became affordable. It does show that maintaining the same purchasing power required more money.
Rent brings the city into the calculation. For someone moving for work, the national price basket can miss the pace of change in a particular rental market. Recent figures from Hyderabad, Kolkata, Bengaluru, Pune and Delhi show how differently those markets moved.
Rents rose fastest in Hyderabad: 15% in a year.
Reported rental-value growth · Q1 2025–Q1 2026 · Magicbricks
All five cities recorded rent increases; Hyderabad, Kolkata and Bengaluru saw double-digit growth.
These are portal-based market indicators, not increases paid by every tenant or a fixed set of identical homes.
Use the city overview’s Rent YoY Change column. Do not calculate growth by comparing the top-searched-locality 2-BHK averages across editions: their composition can change. None. The report’s year-on-year changes are reproduced directly.
Hyderabad, Kolkata, Bengaluru, Pune and Delhi; Q1 2025–Q1 2026. Unit: percent change over one year. Denominator: Publisher’s city rental-value series.
| City | Year-on-year rent growth (%) |
|---|---|
| Hyderabad | 15 |
| Kolkata | 13.3 |
| Bengaluru | 12.5 |
| Pune | 6.6 |
| Delhi | 6.4 |
These are market indicators from a property portal, not rent increases faced by every tenant. An existing lease, a shared home or a different neighbourhood can produce a different bill. But a person entering one of these markets meets the rents available now, not the budget they imagined a year earlier.
Covering the monthly bills is only the first test. The next is whether there is enough left to save and whether those savings can survive a large commitment or an unexpected expense.
04 / Building security
What is left for a home or a hospital bill?
A home’s price is only part of its affordability. Income, interest rates, the deposit and access to a loan determine whether someone can buy it. A rise in property prices alone cannot tell us how much harder repayment has become.
Home-loan payments take a larger share of income.
Modelled EMI-to-income ratios · selected household income groups
The modelled ratio rises from 43% to 60% for EWS households and from 28% to 40% for MIG households.
These are the report’s household-group estimates, not ratios observed for young graduates or the five rental cities. The 2025 estimate is the report’s in-year snapshot.
EMI divided by household income: higher values imply a heavier repayment burden. The report does not provide sufficient model inputs here to reproduce the ratios independently. Its MIG difference is misprinted as 11 points; 40 − 28 = 12 percentage points. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; 2020 and in-year 2025 report estimate. Unit: percent of household income. Denominator: Modelled EWS and MIG household income.
| Group | Value | Comparison period |
|---|---|---|
| Economically weaker section | 43 | 2020 |
| Economically weaker section | 60 | 2025 report estimate |
| Middle-income group | 28 | 2020 |
| Middle-income group | 40 | 2025 report estimate |
The report’s model looks beyond young professionals to household income groups. Its implication is still relevant to the transition we are following: buying a home requires enough income to keep paying after the mortgage instalment. A better-paying job, a second household income or a lower interest rate can change that calculation. A graduate’s individual salary should not be mistaken for a household’s combined resources.
Health expenses pose a different kind of threat. They arrive without waiting for the deposit to be saved or the emergency fund to be ready. The question is how much a household must pay after reimbursement, rather than the hospital’s initial invoice alone.
Average hospital spending nearly doubled in rural India.
Out-of-pocket medical spending per hospital stay · 2017–18 and 2025 · nominal rupees
Mean spending after reimbursements rose 97.6% in rural India and 75.6% in urban India.
This is spending growth, not medical-price inflation. Treatment mix, hospital choice and coverage also changed. These averages do not establish catastrophic hardship.
Compare net medical expenditure in both surveys. Exclude childbirth and non-medical costs such as transport and food. Earlier estimates are calculated from rounded published rupee values; 2025 estimates are published directly. Means are not typical or median bills. 2017–18 net medical spending = mean gross medical spending minus mean reimbursement per case. Rural: 16,676 − 740 = 15,936. Urban: 26,475 − 4,444 = 22,031. Growth to 2025: 97.6% rural, 75.6% urban.
India, by rural and urban residence; 2017–18 and 2025 surveys; preceding 365-day recall. Unit: rupees per hospitalisation. Denominator: Hospitalisation cases, excluding childbirth; all hospital types.
| Residence | Mean net medical spending (₹) | Survey period | Derivation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | 15936 | 2017–18 | 16,676 gross medical expenditure minus 740 reimbursement per case |
| Rural | 31484 | 2025 | Published out-of-pocket medical expenditure |
| Urban | 22031 | 2017–18 | 26,475 gross medical expenditure minus 4,444 reimbursement per case |
| Urban | 38688 | 2025 | Published out-of-pocket medical expenditure |
The increase is substantial, but it is not a price index for the same treatment. The two surveys include different mixes of patients, procedures and hospitals. Averages also conceal a wide spread of bills. What these figures establish is a rise in average spending after reimbursements, not that every household experienced the same increase or was pushed into financial ruin.
It is against that background of monthly expenses, housing commitments and the need for a buffer that a couple may consider the next responsibility: supporting a child.
05 / Starting a family
A family needs money. It also needs time.
For people who want children, the decision is not just whether they can meet this month’s expenses. They are taking on years of recurring costs. Schooling is one measurable part of that commitment; it cannot stand in for food, housing, health care and all the other costs of raising a child.
School management changes the reported annual bill.
Average household spending per school student · current academic year
The reported average was ₹2,863 in government schools and ₹25,002 in non-government schools.
‘Non-government’ is the source’s broader management category; do not read it as private unaided schools alone. All school levels and India’s rural and urban households are combined. Private coaching is excluded. This is school expenditure, not the total cost of raising a child.
Survey conducted April–June 2025; current academic-year spending as reported. The chart retains the source category ‘non-government’ rather than substituting a narrower school type. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; Current academic year reported in April–June 2025. Unit: rupees per student. Denominator: School students by management type.
| Group | Value |
|---|---|
| Government school | 2863 |
| Non-government school | 25002 |
Households reported very different spending for students in government and non-government schools. The contrast does not tell us what every family will pay, or what quality and access look like in their neighbourhood. It does show why the availability of usable public services belongs in a discussion of family finances.
The other budget is time. A household can buy some help, divide the work or have someone reduce paid work to do it. The Time Use Survey shows that domestic work and care are already distributed very unevenly among young women and men.
Unpaid does not mean unoccupied.
Domestic work and caregiving · ages 15–29 · India · 2024
Young women were more likely to do both kinds of work, and participants spent longer doing them.
Participation is the share who did the activity that day. Time is minutes among participants, not all young people. Caregiving includes care beyond children.
All-activity estimates for ages 15–29, rural + urban, Statements 5–6 (printed pp.13–14). Do not add domestic and care participation rates or treat participant times as an average for all women or men. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; 2024; diary reference day. Unit: percent / minutes per participating person. Denominator: All persons aged 15–29 for participation; participants for minutes.
| Group | Value | Sex | Measure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic work | 86.2 | Women | participation |
| Domestic work | 25.9 | Men | participation |
| Caregiving | 45.6 | Women | participation |
| Caregiving | 14.0 | Men | participation |
| Domestic work | 280 | Women | time |
| Domestic work | 87 | Men | time |
| Caregiving | 164 | Women | time |
| Caregiving | 77 | Men | time |
These activities include caring for household members other than children. They matter here because starting a family adds to an existing division of labour. An offer of paid work does not remove the need to cook, clean or care; someone still has to do it.
That makes “stepping back” a difficult label. A person outside paid employment may be doing indispensable work at home. Before treating the absence of a job as a refusal of ambition, we need to look at what the data actually count.
06 / Outside the expected path
Being outside the path does not tell us why.
NEET means not in employment, education or training. It captures a wider group than the unemployed labour force: people looking for work can be NEET, but so can people who are not seeking work. It helps us see how many young people are outside those institutions. It cannot tell us that they deliberately left them.
Outside work or study does not mean choosing to withdraw.
Employment, education and training status · India · ages 15–29
Reported NEET shares were 25.0% overall, 8.0% for young men and 42.2% for young women.
NEET is a status, not a measure of deliberate withdrawal. The education-and-training module began in July 2025; do not read this as a full-year 2025 estimate.
Table 57.1: all-India rural + urban, ages 15–29. The precise within-year observation window is not specified in the extracted table. A person may be seeking work, doing unpaid care, facing barriers or outside these activities for other reasons. Table 58.1 row 459 provides the mutually exclusive composition (male B–D, female F–H, all persons J–L). Overall components sum to 99.9% because of rounding; they are not renormalised. Reported total NEET shares are retained from Table 57.1. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; PLFS 2025 publication; module introduced July 2025. Unit: percent. Denominator: All persons aged 15–29 within each sex group.
| Population aged 15–29 | Share (%) | Status | Reported total NEET (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| All young people | 4.1 | NEET · unemployed | 25 |
| All young people | 20.8 | NEET · outside labour force | 25 |
| All young people | 75 | In work, education or training | 25 |
| Young men | 5.5 | NEET · unemployed | 8 |
| Young men | 2.5 | NEET · outside labour force | 8 |
| Young men | 92 | In work, education or training | 8 |
| Young women | 2.8 | NEET · unemployed | 42.2 |
| Young women | 39.4 | NEET · outside labour force | 42.2 |
| Young women | 57.8 | In work, education or training | 42.2 |
The large difference between young women and men belongs beside the unpaid-work evidence, not inside a claim that women are more likely to “give up”. The two surveys do not link the same individuals, so the care figures cannot explain every NEET case. They are a reason to ask about responsibilities and barriers before assuming a motive.
Delays also occur among people who have found work. A separate Deloitte survey, whose India Gen Z sample was largely graduates and full-time workers, asked respondents directly about financial pressure and life decisions.
Financial pressure is postponing adult life.
India respondents · Deloitte 2026 Gen Z and Millennial Survey
54% of Gen Z respondents said their financial circumstances had delayed a major life decision.
India sample: 506 Gen Z and 300 millennials; 69% of Gen Z respondents were graduates and 70% worked full time. This is not a representative estimate for all young Indians or the PLFS NEET population.
Survey fieldwork: 24 November 2025–15 January 2026. These are separate questions, not shares that add to 100%, and not longitudinal evidence about the same people growing older. The housing item reports present inability to afford home ownership, not an expectation about future affordability. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; Fieldwork November 2025–January 2026. Unit: percent of survey respondents. Denominator: 506 Gen Z and 300 millennial respondents in India.
| Group | Value | Generation |
|---|---|---|
| Delayed major life decisions | 54 | Gen Z |
| Delayed major life decisions | 44 | Millennials |
| Living from payday to payday | 47 | Gen Z |
| Living from payday to payday | 41 | Millennials |
| Cannot afford to own a home | 37 | Gen Z |
| Cannot afford to own a home | 20 | Millennials |
| Feel financially insecure | 29 | Gen Z |
| Feel financially insecure | 18 | Millennials |
That is closer to the educated working population at the centre of this story, but it remains a limited survey sample. It does not measure the motives of everyone counted as NEET. What it adds is a reported experience: being in work can coexist with postponing a life decision because of money.
And for people who want a family, postponement is not necessarily a change in desire. UNFPA’s India findings ask about the barriers between the family people want and the family they believe they can have.
Money is the most reported barrier to desired family size.
Selected barriers to desired family formation · India respondents · UNFPA–YouGov, 2025
Financial limitations were reported by 38% of Indian respondents.
An online poll, not a census of young Indians. These selected barriers overlap; they do not add to 100%. Wanting fewer or no children is a different matter from being unable to have the family one wants.
The India brief summarises an online poll of 14,000 respondents across 14 countries. It does not state the India subsample size in the cited brief. Values are India findings, not the pooled international average. None. Published values reproduced as reported.
India; 2025 report. Unit: percent of Indian survey respondents. Denominator: Indian respondents in the UNFPA–YouGov online poll.
| Group | Value |
|---|---|
| Financial limitations | 38 |
| Housing issues | 22 |
| Job insecurity | 21 |
| Lack of affordable childcare | 18 |
The expected sequence depends on each step leaving enough room for the next. A recruitment process needs to offer a credible timetable. A job needs to leave something after rent and essentials. Buying a home requires a manageable repayment burden. Starting a family requires care, time and services a household can use and afford.
Those are concrete conditions against which promises of opportunity can be judged: access to work that pays enough to save, housing within reach of jobs, health care that protects the household budget, and schooling and childcare that do not require one person to give up an income. Better conditions would make continuing along that path more feasible. They would also make changing direction less punishing.
Siddharth found another way forward when an examination stopped organising his life. Others may want a different pace, a different career, or no marriage or children at all. The question is whether a person can make that choice, or whether the life they want keeps receding beyond what their work can support.
Primary sources
Each figure links to its source and provides the exact plotted values, a CSV download and the method. National statistics, commercial market indicators and online surveys describe different populations; they are not combined into a single estimate of “lying flat”.
- PIB · CGL applications, 2025
- PIB · final result, 14 May 2026
- SSC · final shortlist
- PIB · notification
- SSC · tentative calendar
- SSC · Tier-I result
- SSC · Tier-II schedule
- MoSPI · PLFS 2025, Table 21
- Infosys · April 2007 earnings call, p.4
- GGSIPU USAR · 2025 placement report, pp.5–6
- MoSPI · July 2026 CPI release, Annexure IV
- Magicbricks · Rental Index Q1 2026, City Overview, p.2
- Knight Frank · India Affordable Housing 2025, p.14
- MoSPI · NSS 75th round, Statement 3.15 and Table A21
- MoSPI · NSS 80th round health survey, p.4
- MoSPI / PIB · Comprehensive Modular Survey: Education 2025
- MoSPI · Time Use Survey 2024, Statements 5–6
- MoSPI · PLFS 2025, Table 57.1
- MoSPI · PLFS 2025, Table 58.1, all-India ages 15–29
- Deloitte · India report, pp.3–4
- UNFPA · India Insights, State of World Population 2025, p.2
Reported account
Siddharth’s interview, 1 March 2022. This is an attributed personal account, not a representative sample of aspirants. Subsequent outcomes are stated as of the interview.
NEET retains its July 2025 module qualification. The salary comparison is illustrative because the historical compensation components are not itemised. Source limitations and calculations are retained in each figure’s data panel.